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Part IV
Indigenous Justice and the
Administrative State

Diagnosing Administrative Law:
A Comment on Clyde River and
Chippewas of the Thames First Nation
Kate Glover Berger*

I. INTRODUCTION: THE DUTY TO CONSULT’S DIAGNOSIS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks, Binnie J. observed that
administrative law processes and remedies are sufficiently nimble and
robust to account for the constitutional rights and interests of Indigenous
Peoples.1 The comment, directed to a procedural issue, disclosed a faith
in existing frameworks of Canadian administrative law to compel
government actors to act honourably and respond meaningfully when
Indigenous communities are, or could be, affected by government action.
This faith was not intended to diminish or downplay the constitutional
character of the honour of the Crown or the duty to consult and
accommodate. Rather, it affirmed that this principle and these duties are
not only matters of interest to constitutional law, but are also of particular
concern for the law of good government decision-making; that is, for
administrative law. There was no need therefore, in Binnie J.’s
conception of Canadian state public law, to develop novel constitutional
remedies to address failures of consultation or dishonourable public
decision-making practices. Rather, the remedies of administrative law,
with their capacities to declare, quash and compel, already offered
mechanisms for substantial redress and the pursuit of reconciliation.
*

B.A. (McGill), LL.B. (Dalhousie), LL.M. (Cambridge), D.C.L. (McGill). Assistant
Professor, Faculty of Law, Western University. A draft of this paper was presented at the 21st
Annual Osgoode Hall Constitutional Cases Conference on April 13, 2018. Thank you to Sonia
Lawrence and Benjamin Berger for inviting me to participate and for their expertise all along. Thank
you also to the Conference participants, whose questions and comments helped to advance the
arguments in this paper. A final thank you to the reviewers and editors of the Supreme Court Law
Review, whose insights were invaluable in sharpening and clarifying the piece.
1
[2010] S.C.J. No. 53, 2010 SCC 53, at para. 47 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Little
Salmon/Carmacks”].
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There is nothing intrinsic to the field of administrative law that would
prevent Binnie J.’s observation from becoming a reality, rather than
simply an aspiration. Shortcomings tend to arise through theory and
practice, through choice and decision, through historical inheritances and
present biases, not through the identification of a field itself. Further, the
fact that Aboriginal and treaty rights and the honour of the Crown are of
a constitutional character does not mean that they automatically overflow
the containers of flexibility and responsiveness that administrative
remedies and review can offer. Administrative law strives to
accommodate the full range of legal principles, rules, traditions, and
remedies that govern government decision-making and there is nothing
in the logic or ethic of administrative law that necessarily precludes the
attainment of this goal. That said, given the breadth of the field and its
ambition, the health of administrative law cannot be taken for granted;
regular check-ups are needed.
One part of checking in on the health of administrative law, the part
with which this paper is concerned, is to test the accuracy of Binnie J.’s
diagnosis of the state of the relationship between administrative law and
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.2 To do so,3 this paper examines
the Supreme Court of Canada’s most recent cases dealing with the duty to
consult — Clyde River4 and Chippewas of the Thames5 — in light of
Binnie J.’s claim. As will be discussed in greater detail below, these cases
speak directly to the current state of the law on consultation, administrative
law, and the relationship between them. These decisions show that the
courts conceive of the core principles and rules of Canadian state law on
the duty to consult as relatively stable. Haida Nation is the legal lodestar
for consultation and accommodation, setting out the principles
that underlie the duty, as well as the analytical frameworks that should be
used to work through questions of consultation in individual cases.6

2

Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
Many others have explored aspects of this relationship. See, e.g., Sari Graben & Abbey
Sinclair, “Tribunal Administration and the Duty to Consult: A Study of the National Energy Board”
(Fall 2015) 65 U.T.L.J. 382; Janna Promislow, “Irreconcilable? The Duty to Consult and
Administrative Decision Makers” (2013) Cdn. J. Admin. L. & Prac. 251.
4
Clyde River (Hamlet) v. Petroleum Geo-Services Inc., [2017] S.C.J. No. 40, 2017 SCC 40
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Clyde River”].
5
Chippewas of the Thames First Nation v. Enbridge Pipelines Inc., [2017] S.C.J. No. 41,
2017 SCC 41 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chippewas of the Thames”].
6
Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, 2004 SCC
73 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Haida Nation”].
3
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The post-Haida Nation cases — Carrier Sekani,7 Little Salmon/Carmacks
First Nation8 and Tsilhqot’in Nation9 — then fill in many of the details.
Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames, along with a third recent case
that deals with a duty to consult issue, Ktunaxa,10 do not test the holdings
of these foundational cases; they apply and clarify them, adding some
nuance in not unexpected ways. In Clyde River and Chippewas of the
Thames, for example, the Court confirms that the actions of independent
regulatory agencies can trigger the Crown’s duty to consult. Further, these
cases affirm that the Crown can rely on the processes of these
administrative tribunals and agencies to satisfy its duty to consult and
accommodate, as long as the statutory powers of the agency allow for
processes that can satisfy the duty. Further still, Clyde River and
Chippewas of the Thames clarify that administrative decision-makers
cannot make final decisions that could adversely affect the rights and
interests of Indigenous Peoples without assessing whether the consultative
demands of section 35(1) have been met. A decision taken without such an
assessment is unconstitutional. Then Ktunaxa applies Haida Nation,
confirming that upon judicial review, a government conclusion that adequate
consultation and accommodation have taken place is entitled to deference, to
be reviewed on a standard of reasonableness.
These holdings show that Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames,
along with Ktunaxa, fit comfortably in the arc of contemporary duty to
consult jurisprudence. So too, this paper argues, do they fit within the
trajectory of modern administrative law writ large. Over the past several
decades, a paradigm shift has unfolded in contemporary administrative law
jurisprudence, namely a shift from demonstrable skepticism and fear of the
administrative state to evident comfort and trust in administrative decisionmakers. The courts have come to conceive of the administrative state as vital
to effective governance. Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames fit neatly
within this narrative of confidence and trust. Indeed, these recent cases draw
attention to the narrative of confidence, which was previously latent and
abstract, and expose some of its implications. In bringing this narrative into
high relief, Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames reveal insights into

7

Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, [2010] S.C.J. No. 43, 2010 SCC
43 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Carrier Sekani”].
8
Little Salmon/Carmacks, supra, note 1.
9
Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] S.C.J. No. 44, 2014 SCC 44 (S.C.C.).
10
Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia (Forests, Lands, and Resources Operations), [2017]
S.C.J. No. 54, 2017 SCC 54 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ktunaxa”].
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the current state not only of the law on the duty to consult, but also — and
perhaps more starkly — of administrative law more broadly.
In this paper, I examine the 2017 decisions of Clyde River and
Chippewas of the Thames in light of Binnie J.’s faith in administrative
law. In Part II, I sketch the shifts in administrative law jurisprudence that
set the foundations of the narrative of confidence within which Binnie’s
comments are nested. Then, in Part III, I outline the primary lessons and
developments on the duty to consult from the Supreme Court’s opinions
in Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames and indicate how they
continue this narrative.
In Part IV, I turn to the ways that Clyde River and Chippewas of the
Thames also expose how judicial confidence in the administrative state
has implications relevant not only to the duty to consult, but also to the
future health of administrative law and public decision-making. This
section focuses on two examples of these implications, striving to
describe rather than resolve the challenges revealed. The first example
deals with the process of consultation and warns against bestowing such
responsibility on administrative decision-makers while simultaneously
neglecting to hold other state institutions accountable for their own
duties of consultation and good governance. The second deals with the
process of judicial review of administrative action and sharpens
existing concerns about relying on categories of question as proxies for
qualitative assessments of context in the standard of review analysis.
I conclude in Part V by signalling a final lesson learned, and question
raised, about the narrative of confidence in Clyde River and Chippewas
of the Thames. The lesson stems from the holding in Chippewas of the
Thames that administrative agencies “must usually” provide reasons to
address concerns about the adequacy of consultation, but that neither a
“formulaic ‘Haida analysis’” nor explicit reasons are necessarily
required.11 Here, the Court’s faith in sound administrative judgment
despite the absence of reasons highlights the chronic idealism with which
the courts have treated administrative decision-making. And this idealism
raises the forward-looking question posed in Part V: What should, indeed
what must, a meaningful conception of confidence demand of the
administrative state?

11

at para. 63.

Clyde River, supra, note 4, at paras. 41 and 42; Chippewas of the Thames, supra, note 5,
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II. CONFIDENCE IN THE REGULATORY STATE
The narrative in contemporary Canadian public law about the
administrative state has changed since the early days of administrative
law. Over the past four decades, with the explosive growth of the
administrative state across the 20th century, scholarly skepticism about
the capacity of regulatory agencies and independent statutory tribunals to
serve as legal decision-makers and act in accordance with law, has given
way to faith in administrative actors as essential to the modern state.
Fears about reckless and arbitrary exercises of executive discretion have
waned somewhat, with debates now focused on how best to manage
discretionary decision-making power rather than how to avoid or stifle
it.12 A shift towards trust or confidence in the administrative state has also
been apparent in Canadian public law jurisprudence over the last halfcentury.13 A close reading of the case law reveals several developments and
turns in the law, each one reflecting a deepening judicial appreciation of the
work of administrative decision-makers and their contribution to access to
justice, the delivery of public programs, and effective governance. Together,
these turns in the law and scholarship signal a broader shift in conceptions of
the administrative state in Canada’s public order, a shift from skepticism to
confidence, from fear to respect, from toleration to embrace.
While not exhaustive, for the purposes of this paper, there are three
turns in the modern case law that are particularly revealing of the
confidence in the administrative state that has emerged in Canadian
public law. The first is found in the transformation of judicial resistance
to administrative power into a posture of judicial deference to
administrative decisions, including deference on questions of law and
statutory interpretation.14 While the courts still exercise powers of
12

For a helpful summary of this transition, see, e.g., Colleen M. Flood & Jennifer Dolling,
“A Historical Map for Administrative Law: There Be Dragons” in Colleen M. Flood & Lorne
Sossin, eds., Administrative Law in Context, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Emond Publications, 2018)
1 [hereinafter “Flood & Sossin”].
13
On the constitutional implications of these turns in the law, see Kate Glover, “The
Constitutional Status of the Administrative State” (February 20, 2018), online: Double Aspect
<https://doubleaspectblog.wordpress.com>.
14
See, e.g., CUPE Local 963 v. New Brunswick Liquor Corp., [1979] S.C.J. No. 45, [1979]
2 S.C.R. 227 (S.C.C.); Union des employés de service, local 298 v. Bibeault, [1988] S.C.J. No. 101,
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bibeault”]; Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent
of Brokers), [1994] S.C.J. No. 58, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557 (S.C.C.); Canada (Director of Investigation
and Research) v. Southam Inc., [1996] S.C.J. No. 116, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748 (S.C.C.); Pushpanathan
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] S.C.J. No. 46, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Pushpanathan”]; Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, 2008 SCC
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exacting review under a correctness standard in some cases,15 this is now
the exception rather than the norm. A “well-established presumption” has
emerged, such that when an administrative body interprets its home
statute or statutes familiar to it, an interpretive task at the heart of
administrative action, the reasonableness standard will apply.16 Indeed,
the Court has accepted that “the fact that the legislature has allocated
authority to a decision maker other than the courts is itself an indication
that the legislature intended deferential review”.17 This deferential
approach reflects a judicial appreciation for the expertise of
administrative bodies within their statutory realm, a respect for the
capacity of specialized decision-makers to respond nimbly to the
questions of regulation and policy that arise before them, and a
sensitivity to the wisdom and intent of the legislature in the design of
regulatory agencies. And in this commitment to deference, we see an
institutional identity shift not only for administrative decision-makers,
but also for the courts. That is, the courts are abandoning the premise that
judges are always best suited to respond to legal disputes and valuing
the authority, competence, and expertise of decision-makers within
the administrative state. Showing deference is, in some measure, an act
of trust.
The second turn in the jurisprudence that exposes the courts’
confidence in the administrative state is found in judicial interpretation of
section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.18 Section 96 protects the special
status and core jurisdiction of the superior courts, striving to shield the
country’s courts of general jurisdiction from legislative or executive
attack.19 This section of the Constitution can thus be used to challenge
legislation that creates new administrative bodies that deal with matters
historically resolved by the superior courts. In the early eras of Canadian
administrative law, a protectionist stance prevailed, with the courts
interpreting section 96 in ways that constrained the growth of the

9 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dunsmuir”]; West Fraser Mills Ltd. v. British Columbia (Workers’
Compensation Appeal Tribunal, [2018] S.C.J. No. 22, 2018 SCC 22 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “West
Fraser Mills”]; Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General),
[2018] S.C.J. No. 31, 2018 SCC 31 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canada (CHRC)”].
15
For when correctness applies, see Dunsmuir, id., at paras. 57-61.
16
Canada (CHRC), supra, note 14, at para. 27.
17
Id., at para. 50.
18
(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.
19
MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson, [1995] S.C.J. No. 101, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 725 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “MacMillan Bloedel”].
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administrative state.20 And yet by the mid-20th century, the courts had
pivoted to a facilitative position, recognizing generous legislative
authority within section 96 to establish new regulatory bodies and quasijudicial tribunals that were connected to government policy goals and
coherent in their design.21 As Lamer C.J.C. explained in concurring
reasons in Reference re Amendments to the Residential Tenancies Act
(N.S.), a case about the constitutionality of Nova Scotia’s residential
tenancies scheme, the flexible jurisprudential approach to section 96
emerged from “sympathy for the proposition that s. 96 should not be
interpreted so as to thwart or unduly restrict the future growth of
provincial administrative tribunals”.22 Rather, “‘[a]daptations must be
permitted to allow the legislatures scope to deal effectively with
emerging social problems and concerns, and to develop new techniques
of dispute resolution and the expeditious disposition of relatively minor
disputes’ for the benefit of its citizenry … After all, the Constitution is a
document for the people and one of the most important goals of any
system of dispute resolution is to serve well those who make use of it.”23
Here, the affirmation of confidence in the administrative state is
expressed through creating conditions in which it can flourish.
The third illustrative turn in the case law emerges from the courts’
wrestling with questions about the constitutional jurisdiction of
administrative actors. In the Supreme Court’s words, the relationship
between the courts, the Constitution and administrative decision-makers
has been “completely revised” over time.24 In the later decades of
the 20th century, the historic judicial reluctance to recognize a
direct relationship between administrative decision-makers and the
Constitution25 was overtaken by a decisive trend: a move towards
20

See, e.g., Toronto Corp. v. York Corp., [1938] AC 415 (P.C.).
See, e.g., Saskatchewan (Labour Relations Board) v. John East Iron Works Ltd., [1948]
J.C.J. No. 5, [1949] A.C. 134 (P.C.); Québec (Procureur Général) v. Barreau de la province de
Québec, [1965] S.C.R. 772 (S.C.C.); Tomko v. Nova Scotia (Labour Relations Board), [1975] S.C.J.
No. 111, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 112 (S.C.C.); Mississauga (City) v. Peel (Regional Municipality), [1979]
S.C.J. No. 46, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 244 (S.C.C.); Reference re Residential Tenancies Act 1979 (Ontario),
[1981] S.C.J. No. 57, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714 (S.C.C.); Reference re Amendments to the Residential
Tenancies Act (N.S), [1996] S.C.J. No. 13, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 186 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Residential
Tenancies Reference No. 2”].
22
Residential Tenancies Reference No. 2, id., at para. 28.
23
Id.
24
Doré v. Barreau du Québec, [2012] S.C.J. No. 12, 2012 SCC 12, at para. 30 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Doré”].
25
See, e.g., Cooper v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), [1996] S.C.J.
No. 115, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 854 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cooper”].
21
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broadening the jurisdiction of administrative decision-makers over
constitutional matters and loosening the exclusive judicial grip on
constitutional interpretation. The law now recognizes, for example, that
administrative decision-makers must engage widely and directly with the
obligations and values of the Constitution as they execute their mandates.
Administrative actors are on the front lines of interpreting and
implementing constitutional rights and obligations in their interactions
with the public.26 Accordingly, administrative decision-makers are bound
to act in accordance with the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms27 and must exercise their discretion in ways that are infused
with Charter values and substantive commitments to proportionality.28 As
another example, the law now provides that public actors with the
authority to decide questions of law are necessarily empowered to
answer the constitutional questions attached to those legal matters and to
grant remedies under section 24(1) of the Charter, unless such authority
has been clearly revoked.29 Access to justice, administrative expertise,
and constitutional logic demand nothing less.30 A final example is found
in the deferential posture that the courts now take when reviewing
discretionary decisions of administrative decision-makers that limit
Charter rights or values.31 The deferential approach is intended to reflect
the “distinct advantage that administrative bodies have in applying the
Charter to a specific set of facts and in the context of their enabling

26
See, e.g., Vanessa MacDonnell, “The Civil Servant’s Role in the Implementation of
Constitutional Rights” (2015) 13:2 Intl. J. Constitutional L. 383 [hereinafter “MacDonnell, ‘Civil
Servant’”].
27
Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] S.C.J. No. 45, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038
(S.C.C.); R. v. Conway, [2010] S.C.J. No. 22, 2010 SCC 22, at para. 79 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Conway”]. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
28
Doré, supra, note 24; Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J.
No. 12, 2015 SCC 12 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Loyola High School”]; Law Society of British Columbia
v. Trinity Western University, [2018] S.C.J. No. 32, 2018 SCC 32 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “T.W.U.
(B.C.)”]; Trinity Western University v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2018] S.C.J. No. 33, 2018
SCC 33 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “T.W.U. (L.S.U.C.)”].
29
Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers’
Compensation Board) v. Laseur, [2003] S.C.J. No. 54, 2003 SCC 54 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Martin”];
Conway, supra, note 27.
30
Conway, id., at para. 79. See also Dunsmuir, supra, note 14, at para. 49; Martin, id.
31
Doré, supra, note 24; Loyola High School, supra, note 28; T.W.U. (B.C.), supra, note 28;
T.W.U. (L.S.U.C.), supra, note 28. For a critique of this approach, see the comments of Lauwers and
Miller JJ.A. in Gehl v. Canada (Attorney General), [2017] O.J. No. 1943, 2017 ONCA 319, at
paras. 68-83 (Ont. C.A.) and T. (E.) v. Hamilton-Wentworth District School Board, [2017] O.J.
No. 6142, 2017 ONCA 893, at paras. 102-125 (Ont. C.A.).
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legislation”.32 In each of these examples, we see the courts’ confidence in
the administrative state reflected in the law’s credence of the deepening
intimacy between statutory actors and the Constitution.
Read in light of this broader narrative of confidence in regulatory actors
and these specific jurisprudential turns towards the administrative state, the
Court’s principal holdings in Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames are
unsurprising. Both cases raised the issue of whether the actions of a
regulatory agency, specifically, the National Energy Board (“Board” or
“NEB”), can either trigger or satisfy the Crown’s duty to consult and
accommodate under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. As is discussed
in greater detail in Part II, the Court’s answer to both queries was,
unanimously, yes. The Court also clarified that in making a final decision on a
matter that might adversely affect Indigenous rights or interests, a regulatory
body must assess whether the duty has been met. A decision taken in the
absence of adequate consultation and accommodation is unconstitutional. In
these clarifications and advancements of the law governing administrative
actors in relation to section 35, Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames
First Nation slide easily into the narrative of confidence recounted above.
They fit comfortably in the part of the story in which administrative actors
are directly accountable to the Constitution and bear the responsibility of
upholding constitutional principles and duties. Indeed, in these two cases, we
see the Court conceiving of regulatory bodies as active participants in
constitutional relationships between government and Indigenous Peoples,
and affirming the role and responsibilities of administrative actors in the
pursuit of reconciliation. In their holdings, these decisions are robust
affirmations of the vital, active, and ultimately deserved role that
administrative actors play in the architecture of Canada’s public order. In the
strength of their commitments regarding the role of the administrative state in
the structure of the Constitution and in the direct responsibilities and high
expectations they place on statutory tribunals, these cases not only contribute
to the narrative of confidence, but also help to push it out of the implicit realm.

III. CONFIDENCE, REGULATORY AGENCIES AND THE DUTY TO
CONSULT
The Court’s opinions in Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames
stand for three propositions in relation to the role of administrative
32

Doré, supra, note 24, at para. 48.
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agencies in the duty to consult. The first confirms that regulatory action
can trigger the Crown’s duty to consult; the second affirms that the
Crown can rely on regulatory processes to fulfil its duty to consult; and
the third clarifies that administrative actors must consider the adequacy
of consultation before issuing a final approval of a project.
The facts in Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames are similar;
both involve corporate parties seeking approval from the National
Energy Board for energy extraction projects. In Clyde River, three
corporate parties (the “proponents”) applied to the Board to carry out
offshore seismic testing for oil and gas resources. The tests involved
towing airguns through Baffin Bay and Davis Strait, producing sound
waves in order to locate and measure underwater energy resources. The
proposed testing would last five years. The Board initiated an
environmental assessment of the project and the Hamlet of Clyde River
objected, raising concerns about the effects of the testing on the treaty
right of the Inuit of Clyde River to harvest marine mammals in the
Nunavut Settlement Area. The Inuit community in the Area relies on
these mammals for physical, economic, cultural, and spiritual well-being.
Their concerns about the impact of the testing were ultimately
undisputed.
Over the next two years, the project’s proponents met with the
communities that would be affected by the testing. The proponents were
often unable to answer basic questions about the impact of their project on
the region’s marine mammals and so the Board suspended its assessment.
Soon after, the proponents submitted to the Board a 4000-page document
addressing the lingering queries. The document was posted online and
delivered to the hamlet offices. It was not translated into Inuktitut. The
Board resumed its assessment.
Throughout the process, Clyde River and other organizations wrote to
the Board and to the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern
Development, calling for further consultation. The Minister denied the
request and the Board continued its deliberations. In 2014, the Board
granted the proponents’ application, concluding that there had been
adequate consultation of Indigenous communities. Further, according to
the Board, while the testing could alter migration routes of marine
mammals, increase their mortality, and thus negatively affect the
harvesting of the mammals, the proponents would strive to mitigate the
chances of significant adverse environmental effects.
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In Chippewas of the Thames, Enbridge Pipelines applied to the
National Energy Board under section 58 of the National Energy Board
Act33 for exemptions from several filing requirements in relation to its
Line 9 Pipeline project. If approved, the project would reverse the flow
and increase the capacity of the Line 9 Pipeline, which has run across the
traditional territory of the Chippewas of the Thames First Nation since
1976. If granted, the exemptions would authorize Enbridge to proceed
with the project without filing a certificate of public convenience and
necessity. Under the National Energy Board Act, the Board was the final
decision-maker on section 58 exemptions.
The Board advised the Chippewas of the Thames and 18 other
potentially affected Indigenous communities about the project and the
Board’s process. The process included a public hearing in late 2013. The
Chippewas of the Thames were granted intervener status, as well as
funding from the Board to participate. In September 2013, before the
hearing was held, the Chiefs of the Chippewas of the Thames and the
Aamjiwnaang First Nation wrote to the Prime Minister, the Minister of
Natural Resources, and the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern
Development, raising concerns about the impact of the Enbridge project
on the asserted Aboriginal and treaty rights of both communities. The
letter urged the Ministers to initiate Crown consultation. In January 2014,
after the Board hearing, the Minister of Natural Resources responded to
the request for consultation. He indicated that the Crown relied on the
Board’s process to fulfil the duty to consult in relation to this project. The
Board ultimately approved the Enbridge project, holding that in light of
the project’s limited scope, the affected Indigenous groups had sufficient
opportunity to be heard through the Board’s process and meetings with
Enbridge. Further, the Board concluded, any impact of the project on the
rights and interests of Indigenous communities was likely to be minimal
and appropriately mitigated.
Clyde River and the Chippewas of the Thames each applied for
judicial review of the Board’s decisions on the grounds of insufficient
consultation. Clyde River was ultimately successful; the Chippewas of
the Thames were not. At stake in each case was the Board’s role in
triggering, satisfying, and assessing compliance with the duty to consult.
Both Clyde River and the Chippewas of the Thames argued that the
Crown’s constitutional obligations under section 35 could not be satisfied
by a regulatory process in which the Crown did not participate.
33

National Energy Board Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-7.
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The Supreme Court was unpersuaded, leading to the three principal
holdings of these cases. These holdings reflect the comfort and trust that
the law has come to find and have in the administrative state, a comfort
with and trust in the authority, competence, and judgment of
administrative actors, a comfort and trust of sufficient weight to sustain
the responsibility of pursuing reconciliation between Indigenous Peoples
and the Crown. I turn to these holdings now.
First, the Court held that the actions of a regulatory agency, like
decisions and authorizations issued by the National Energy Board, can
constitute Crown action that triggers the duty to consult and
accommodate. Justices Karakatsanis and Brown, writing for the Court,
affirmed that the duty is a constitutional obligation owed by the Crown
and that regulatory agencies are neither “the Crown”, strictly speaking,
nor its agents. However, they held, these observations alone do not
adequately account for the character of the administrative state or its
connection to the Crown. “[O]nce it is accepted”, and it must be so
accepted, they held, “that a regulatory agency exists to exercise executive
power as authorized by legislatures, any distinction between its actions
and Crown action quickly falls away.”34 The regulatory agency becomes
“the vehicle through which the Crown acts” and it becomes unhelpful to
distinguish between the Crown and an agency as final decision-maker on
a resource project.35 The statutory body exercises its powers “on behalf
of the Crown”36 and, as a result, its decisions constitute Crown action,
which can then in turn trigger the duty to consult. Justices Karakatsanis
and Brown explained, “the duty, like the honour of the Crown, does not
evaporate simply because a final decision has been made by a tribunal
established by Parliament, as opposed to Cabinet”.37 The final decisions
of a regulatory agency, they held, can thus constitute Crown conduct that
triggers the duty to consult.
In this holding, the Court strives to reason from the realities of
administrative justice, from a recognition that in the modern regulatory
state, administrative actors are the primary decision-makers in most legal
disputes and for most individuals interacting with or seeking an outcome

34
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from the public sector,38 including in processes of regulating and
approving resource projects and other public works with the potential to
adversely affect Aboriginal and treaty rights. The Court’s aim to develop
the law in line with the perceived realities of administrative action and
their potential impact on Indigenous communities reflects the Court’s
belief in the importance of the work of regulatory agencies and a
confidence in the capacity of those agencies to carry out their mandates,
once granted, in meaningful and serious ways. Such was the case in
Clyde River. The Board issued a final decision regarding the proponents’
application to conduct seismic testing. In so doing, the Board was the
vehicle through which the Crown acted and the duty to consult was
triggered. The same was true in Chippewas of the Thames. The Board’s
decision to approve the Enbridge project triggered the Crown’s duty to
consult. “As a statutory body with the delegated executive responsibility
to make a decision that could adversely affect Aboriginal and treaty
rights”, the Court reasoned, “the NEB acted on behalf of the Crown in
approving Enbridge’s application.”39 In that moment, the obligation to
provide meaningful consultation, consultation to the constitutional
standard, had to arise. To hold otherwise would be blind to the potential
adverse effect of the Board’s processes on the constitutional rights of the
Chippewas of the Thames First Nation.
The second principal holding in Clyde River and Chippewas of the
Thames is more accurately a confirmation, an affirmation that the Crown
is entitled to rely on regulatory processes in order to fulfil its duty to
consult. The Crown need not directly participate in the processes and
indeed, according to the Court, need not supervise every instance of
consultation. Rather, the critical query for the Crown will be whether the
administrative agency has the statutory capacity to engage in adequate
consultation and accommodation in the circumstances. By confirming
this framework, read alongside its section 35 jurisprudence, the Court
can be taken to signal its trust in the actors of the administrative state to
execute their mandates in accordance with the principles and duties
embodied in section 35, that is, to use their procedural discretion to
respond meaningfully to the demands of the Constitution. It is, in effect,
a confidence in the capacity of administrative decision-makers to act
honourably.
38
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On the facts of both Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames, the
Court concluded that the Crown was justified, at least in principle, in
relying on the Board to fulfil the duty to consult. The Board, with its
procedural powers to hold hearings, solicit information, impose
conditions, conduct environmental assessments, and establish funding
programs for public participation under the Canada Oil and Gas
Operations Act (in Clyde River) and the National Energy Board Act (in
Chippewas of the Thames), had the capacity to consult to the requisite
constitutional threshold with the Inuit of Clyde River and the Chippewas
of the Thames First Nation. Similarly, the Board, with its remedial
authority to attach conditions and deny applications, had the capacity to
accommodate the rights of Indigenous communities, when appropriate.
So too, in its expertise in supervising energy projects, the Board had the
institutional and technical expertise needed to conduct meaningful
consultations and implement appropriate accommodations. In these
circumstances, the Court held, the Crown was entitled to rely on the
deliberative process of the Board to satisfy its obligation to engage in
consultation with the Indigenous communities potentially affected by
these energy projects. Confidence in the Board to make constitutional
rights real was, in other words, justified.
The third issue requiring the Court’s attention in Clyde River and
Chippewas of the Thames dealt with the duty of regulatory agencies to
consider Crown consultation before approving a project or taking other
action. Drawing on Carrier Sekani40 and Conway,41 the Court stated a
general rule, that “a tribunal empowered to consider questions of law
must determine whether … consultation was constitutionally sufficient”
as long as the issue is properly raised and the authority to decide
constitutional questions has not been expressly withdrawn.42 In these
circumstances, an administrative agency must consider the sufficiency
of consultation in order to protect the constitutionality of its own
decision. While the Crown always bears the responsibility to ensure that
the honour of the Crown is upheld, “administrative decision makers have
both the obligation to decide necessary questions of law raised before
them and an obligation to make their decisions within the contours of
the state’s constitutional obligations”.43 Again, the Court held, when the
agency is the final decision-maker on a project, the agency’s power and
40
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obligation to assess the adequacy of consultation does not depend on
whether the government participates in the Board’s proceedings. Section 35
is clear, Karakatsanis and Brown JJ. explained, in its demand for adequate
consultation and uncompromising in its disdain for attempts to “pass the
buck” of technical responsibility between government actors. Thus, the rule
is simple: Once the Crown’s duty to consult has been triggered, “a decision
maker may only proceed to approve a project if Crown consultation is
adequate.”44 This is the case regardless of who bears ultimate responsibility
for carrying out consultation, the Crown or the agency. And here, in the
obligation of administrative actors to assess compliance with section 35
before a project is approved or a decision is taken, to ensure that the state is
not running roughshod over the rights of Indigenous Peoples, to uphold
some of the most fundamental values of Canadian constitutionalism, is the
signal of the Court’s faith in these regulatory actors to be active players in
the pursuit of reconciliation.
The Board lived up to the Court’s expectations in Chippewas of the
Thames, but not in Clyde River. On the facts of Chippewas of the
Thames, the Court concluded that the Crown was not only entitled to rely
on the Board’s process to satisfy the duty to consult, but also that the
duty had been satisfied. In the Court’s view, the Board provided the
affected Indigenous communities with adequate opportunities to
participate in the decision-making process. The Chippewas of the
Thames seized this opportunity and participated in the proceedings as an
intervener. They received funding from the Board to participate, tendered
expert evidence, and made closing submissions at the hearing. Further,
the Court held, the Board’s report assessed the potential impact of the
Enbridge project on the rights of Indigenous communities and concluded
that the potential for adverse effects was minimal and could be mitigated.
Further still, the Board imposed a condition on Enbridge for continued
consultation with Indigenous communities, which the Court held
adequately accommodated the Aboriginal rights at stake. Finally, the
Board provided reasons that were directly responsive to the issue of
consultation and section 35. The reasons reviewed the evidence,
identified the interests at stake, assessed the risks of the project, and
imposed conditions on Enbridge. The Court concluded that although the
Board did not discuss the degree of consultation required in the
circumstances or engage in a Haida analysis, the Board’s reasons were
sufficient to show that, taking the Chippewas of the Thames’ arguments
44
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at their strongest, the Board had sufficiently considered the asserted
Aboriginal and treaty rights and accommodated them where appropriate.
This, the Court held, was “manifestly adequate” to satisfy both the
Board’s and the Crown’s obligations under section 35 prior to granting
the exemption.45
The same was not true in Clyde River. On the facts of that case, the
Board was the final decision-maker for the proponents’ application and
the Crown’s duty to consult had been triggered. Further, the Board had
the statutory authority to determine all relevant matters of fact and law
and there was no indication that constitutional jurisdiction had been
withdrawn. Accordingly, the Board was empowered to assess the
sufficiency of consultation and indeed, was constitutionally obliged to
withhold approval of the project until the threshold of sufficiency was
met. And yet, the Court held, the Board failed to do so. The rights at risk
were guaranteed by treaty and the potential for adverse impact was high.
Thus, on the principles and framework well established in Haida, deep
consultation was required. This threshold was not met. While the Crown
was entitled to rely on the Board’s processes to fulfil the duty to consult,
it failed to inform the Inuit of Clyde River that it was doing so. Further,
while the Board assessed the project’s impacts on the marine mammal
populations through its environmental assessment, it failed to consider
the implications of the project on the treaty rights as rights, rather than as
concerns about the environmental impact of the project. Finally, while
the Board had the statutory capacity to provide meaningful consultation,
it failed to do so. No oral hearings were held and affected parties were
not provided funding to collect evidence or prepare expert reports.
Further, the Inuit of Clyde River were never provided with accessible,
substantive answers to their questions about the effect of the project on
the marine mammal population. The Court explained that these
procedural safeguards of participation, funding, and responsiveness are
not a checklist of prerequisites for deep consultation, which will never be
captured by a one-size-fits-all approach. But, the Court held, “their
absence in this case significantly impaired the quality of consultation.”46
The Board had not lived up to the confidence bestowed upon it and
therefore its authorization of the project could not stand.
By drawing administrative tribunals and regulatory agencies further
into constitutional and treaty relationships, I am arguing that Clyde River
45
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and Chippewas of the Thames act on impulses already familiar in
administrative law. In these decisions, the tendency to trust the work of
the administrative state manifests as confidence in the capacity of
administrative decision-makers to exercise their mandates with due
attention to the impact of their decisions on Aboriginal rights, to act
honourably in their interactions with Indigenous Peoples and to refuse to
act without assurance that their decisions advance the aspiration of
reconciliation. These decisions thus fit comfortably into ongoing
conversations in administrative law. The principal holdings of Clyde
River and Chippewas of the Thames are consistent with Binnie J.’s belief
in Little Salmon/Carmacks47 that administrative law is sufficiently robust
to implement and guarantee constitutional forms of consultation. And
yet, as is discussed in Part IV, when these decisions are examined more
closely — when focus falls on the details and the practical implications
of Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames — implications of the
narrative of confidence for both the duty to consult and administrative
law more broadly are brought into relief.

IV. TROUBLES WITH CONFIDENCE
The confidence in administrative actors that has developed in
Canadian public law is intended, it seems, to be comforting. As noted
above, administrative decision-makers are the most common legal
decision-makers and the most frequent way in which citizens interact
with the state. Modern governance has been “administerized” and with
many positive results. The regulatory state has thus come to be treated in
public law as effective, capable, and worthy of our trust, at least in its
systemic, institutional dimensions.
Within this context of administrative law discourse, it seems that the
Supreme Court’s opinions in Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames
are also intended to be comforting. When much executive power is
carried out in the administrative realm and when administrative actors
enjoy much discretionary power, including significant discretion over
who participates in decision-making and how, knowing that these
administrative actors will be held accountable for triggering the duty to
consult, carrying out meaningful consultation, and policing compliance
with section 35 can offer some relief from concerns about the power of
state actors to undermine constitutional rights.
47
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However, a closer reading of the Court’s reasoning in Clyde River and
Chippewas of the Thames on matters of consultation reveals some
concerning consequences of the narrative of confidence for both the way
the duty to consult is carried out and for the future of administrative law
more generally. In this Part, I focus on two such consequences. The first
deals with the process of consultation and, more particularly, the shifts in
institutional responsibility and focus that flow from judicial confidence
in administrative actors. The second deals with the process of judicial
review and, more particularly, the continued reliance on categories of
question in the standard of review analysis.
1. The Process of Consultation and Shifting Accountabilities
In Clyde River, the Court affirms that the duty to consult is, always
and ultimately, a constitutional duty of the Crown. In each instance of
public decision-making that may affect the rights and interests of
Indigenous Peoples, “the Crown always holds ultimate responsibility for
ensuring consultation is adequate.”48 Accordingly, when an
administrative actor is the final decision-maker on a project and either
fails to provide adequate consultation or does not have access to
adequate consultative procedures in its statutory mandate, the Crown
“must provide further avenues for meaningful consultation and
accommodation in order to fulfill the duty prior to project approval.”49
That said, despite the Crown’s ultimate responsibility for fulfilling the
duty to consult and accommodate, it is not, according to the Court in
Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames, responsible for overseeing,
monitoring, or participating in each instance of administrative decisionmaking. As Karakatsanis and Brown JJ. explain, “[p]ractically speaking”
the fact that the Crown, in embodying its duty to act honourably, is the
site of final constitutional responsibility for fulfilling the demands of
section 35, “does not mean that a minister of the Crown must give
explicit consideration in every case to whether the duty to consult has
been satisfied, or must directly participate in the process of
consultation.”50 Rather, as recounted above, the Crown is entitled to rely
on regulatory actors to carry out the appropriate stages of consultation
when those statutory decision-makers render the final decision on a
48
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project. Consider, then, how the process might unfold for an Indigenous
community involved in a determinative regulatory decision-making
scheme in the post-Clyde River legal realm.
Assuming that the agency’s prospective decision could adversely
affect Aboriginal or treaty rights, whether those rights are established or
claimed, the agency’s actions will trigger the duty to consult and,
possibly, to accommodate. If the agency has access to procedural
mechanisms that could satisfy the duty in its statutory mandate, the
Crown is entitled to rely on the agency to satisfy the duty. Within this
model, how is an Indigenous community to proceed if it contests the
adequacy of the agency’s processes of consultation?
Initially, it seems, the affected Indigenous community must wait for the
agency to fail to live up to the constitutional standard and then initiate a
gap-filling process with the Crown. Unlike a party seeking to challenge
government action that contravenes the Charter, an Indigenous claimant or
community concerned with the constitutionality of administrative action
under section 35 cannot go directly to the courts to enforce the right.
Instead, an Indigenous community must seek ad hoc relief from the
Crown. As held in Clyde River, “[w]here the regulatory process being
relied upon does not achieve adequate consultation or accommodation, the
Crown must take further measures to meet its duty”.51 These measures
could include the filling of procedural gaps, making submissions to the
agency, requesting that the agency reconsider a decision, or pursuing
legislative or regulatory amendments. When the regulatory agency is the
final decision-maker in the process, it is responsible not only for carrying
out consultation and implementing accommodations (with the additional
possibility of some gap-filling by the Crown), but also for ultimately
assessing, at first instance, whether the consultation and accommodation
that have taken place are sufficient. Once a final assessment of adequate
consultation is reached at the regulatory stage, judicial review is available
to an Indigenous party seeking more meaningful consultation or more
responsive accommodation of Aboriginal and treaty rights. As the Court
confirms in both Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames, “any decision
affecting Aboriginal or treaty rights made on the basis of inadequate
consultation will not be in compliance with the duty to consult, which is a
constitutional imperative. Where challenged, it should be quashed on
judicial review.”52
51
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This procedural framework, on the one hand, fits into a narrative of
confidence in the performance of administrative agencies within the
architecture of the Canadian state. The central role of these agencies
includes active participation in constitutional processes of consultation
with Indigenous communities who are affected by government decisionmaking. And yet, on the other hand, in this framework, administrative
decision-makers do not bear accountability for their role in consultation
commensurate with their constitutional responsibilities. Rather, the Crown
must step in to fill the administrative decision-maker’s inadequacies.
While this may provide opportunities for flexibility and consultation
tailored to the context, Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames also
hold that the Crown is not legally required to supervise or monitor every
instance of consultation that unfolds at the administrative level, nor is it
legally required to inform the administrative actors that it intends to rely on
the regulatory processes to fulfil the duty to consult. Although the Crown
is under an obligation to inform affected Indigenous communities that it
intends to rely on regulatory processes to satisfy its duty under section 35,
Chippewas of the Thames shows that express notice is not required; silence
can satisfy the duty to inform in the right circumstances. As such, the
scheme set out in these decisions requires that Indigenous communities
bear the burden of initiating, auditing, and alternating between
communication with various administrative, executive, and potentially
judicial, decision-makers to ensure that meaningful consultation takes place.
The procedural framework emerging from Clyde River and
Chippewas of the Thames not only reflects a belief in the administrative
state as powerful, reliable, and trustworthy, but also, in line with a long
thread in section 35 jurisprudence, expressly encourages negotiation over
adjudication in the realization of Aboriginal and treaty rights. “[J]udicial
review is no substitute for adequate consultation”, Karakatsanis and
Brown JJ. write.53 “... True reconciliation is rarely, if ever, achieved in
courtrooms. Judicial remedies may seek to undo past infringements of
Aboriginal and treaty rights, but adequate consultation before project
approval is always preferable to after-the-fact judicial remonstration
following an adversarial process.”54 Consultation is, they continue,
“‘[c]oncerned with an ethic of ongoing relationships’” and so, citing
Haida, “‘negotiation is a preferable way of reconciling state and
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Aboriginal interests’”.55 In the Court’s view, “no one benefits — not
project proponents, not Indigenous peoples, and not non-Indigenous
members of affected communities — when projects are prematurely
approved only to be subjected to litigation.”56
A structural framework that seeks to realize the aspirations of
section 35 should facilitate robust opportunities for meaningful
consultation before a project proceeds rather than through retrospective
remedies. And relying on negotiation with ministerial actors and broad
procedural discretion for regulatory agencies in order to satisfy the duty
to consult and accommodate can facilitate processes that are tailored to
the circumstances of each case and account for the rights at stake, the
impact of the decision-making on those rights, and the historical context.
Further, by locating ultimate responsibility for consultation with the
Crown, the processes prescribed by Clyde River and Chippewas of the
Thames are “responsive to Indigenous Peoples’ arguments to the extent
that [they preserve] their relationship as with the Crown and not with
arm’s length regulatory agencies such as the NEB”.57
However, in favouring negotiation and case-by-case procedural
responses, these two decisions also entrench a preference for
discretionary, ad hoc and policy-based approaches to the pursuit of
reconciliation over statutory frameworks of principle, procedure, and
obligation that can, with careful attention and an embrace of animating
principles, provide more robust constraints on discretion that would also
be subject to formal constitutional scrutiny. When the Crown “can
(indeed, must) correct any flaws in the consultation process” or when
accountability stops at the level of the regulatory agency through judicial
review, there is no motivation to inquire into the systemic barriers to
reconciliation found in the governing legislative structures. Nor is there a
constitutional basis to require legislative or regulatory design that
implements “process[es] designed with the duty to consult in mind”.58
Rather, the approach envisioned in Clyde River and Chippewas of the
Thames contributes to the conditions in which “policy solutions [are
preferred] over legislative frameworks that institutionalize Indigenous
interests”.59 This approach avoids cultivating a culture of legislative and
55
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regulatory design that is animated by the honour of the Crown and
reconciliation. Recourse for inadequate processes that unfold either in
practice or by design is to be found in the Crown and then ultimately the
courts, rather than through the legislative process. In these ways, a firm
commitment to a narrative of confidence in the regulatory state and in the
Crown’s capacity to fill in the gaps may divert energies away from urging
legislatures to participate, alongside all other state actors, in the pursuit of
reconciliation by, for example, trying to cultivate administrative cultures
and conditions for meaningful consultation through careful legislative
drafting, mandate-setting, and administrative design.
This reflection on the institutional and procedural structures that
emerge from Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames is a reminder
that a public order operates through a dynamic network of actors and
elements, each linked to each other by constitutional history, experience,
practice, and design. Given these links, the scope of authority of one
actor within the network must be conceived with regard to the scope of
authority of the others. Shifts in power and role for one will inevitably be
felt by the others.60 Accordingly, when confidence attaches to the
administrative state — just one part of the network — in ways and in
places in which it did not historically attach, not only is an inquiry into
the implications of confidence for administrative actors warranted, but so
too is an inquiry into the impact of confidence on other institutions in the
network, both individually and in relation to each other. These inquiries
raise two questions: When the courts’ gaze is so set on the administrative
state, which institutions fall out of focus and at what cost? And when the
administrative state is seen to be powerful and trustworthy, which other
institutional relationships are affected and how?
The comments above have already offered the start of an answer to
the first query by suggesting that the narrative of confidence might divert
attention from legislative obligations in relation to section 35. In this
way, Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames serve as reminders that
confidence in one set of actors need not, and must not, lead to neglect of
the roles and responsibilities of other institutions. But these cases also
offer some context relevant to the second query, which asks about the
effect of a narrative of confidence on the relations and interactions
between public institutions. Indeed, given the actors involved, these cases
60
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offer a particularly useful context for reflecting on institutional
relationships. In the usual administrative law case, the relationship of
interest is that between the courts, the executive, and the legislature. But in
Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames, the relevant relationships
engage the courts, Parliament, the regulatory agency, the Crown and
Indigenous Peoples. Unlike in the Charter context, for instance, in these
cases the Court both distinguishes between the elements of the executive,
attributing distinct roles and responsibilities to the Crown and the Board,
and also notes their effective collapse into a single vehicle for carrying out
government policy. I turn now to one of these institutional relationships.
2. The Process of Judicial Oversight and the Choice of Standard of
Review
Recent case law bears witness to the Supreme Court’s struggle to
conceive of and quantify deference in the exercise of judicial review of
administrative action.61 The question of standard of review is a structural
one, one with the relationships between the courts, the legislatures, the
administrative state, and affected parties at its heart. A thick theory of
standard of review must therefore tend to the roles of these institutions
and actors, individually and in relation to each other, within Canada’s
constitutional order.
A narrative about the administrative state will inevitably inform and
shape judicial approaches to standard of review. When the narrative is
one of confidence and administrative actors are conceived as capable,
competent contributors to the rule of law project, the justification for
widespread deference is strengthened. As described in Part II, this has
been the pattern of contemporary administrative law jurisprudence in
Canada. Since Dunsmuir, presumptions of reasonableness as the
applicable standard of review are common. That said, drawing a straight
line between confidence and deference is too simple a response to the
standard of review dilemma given the institutional roles and relationships
involved. A narrative of confidence alone doesn’t tell us much about the
effect of a strong legal conception of the administrative state on other
institutions and their interactions, and what those effects might mean for
a standard of review analysis.
Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames do not expressly address
the issue of standard of review. This is itself a sign and symptom of the
61

See, e.g., Canada (CHRC), supra, note 14; West Fraser Mills, supra, note 14.

130

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Court’s uneven approach to deference in judicial review more generally.
The Court’s reasoning in these cases suggests that reasonableness, or
something akin to it, was at play.62 The Court started its review of the
challenged decisions with the procedural choices of the Board, assessing
the justifiability of those choices in the decision-making context. This is
the methodology of reasonableness.63 Further, Ktunaxa, released shortly
after Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames, confirms that
reasonableness applies when a court reviews a minister’s determination
that consultation was adequate.64 Ktunaxa dealt with the decision of
British Columbia’s Minister of Forests, Lands, and Natural Resources
Operations to approve the development of a ski resort on the spiritual
territory of the Ktunaxa Nation. While the primary issue was whether the
Minister’s decision was consistent with the Ktunaxa’s right of religious
freedom under the Charter, the Court also considered whether the
Minister had consulted adequately with the Ktunaxa before authorizing
the development. In doing so, the Court confirmed that reasonableness
was the appropriate standard when assessing the adequacy of
consultation. It is notable that in Ktunaxa, the applicable standard of
review was taken as settled law, with McLachlin C.J.C. and Rowe J.
concluding (for the Court on this point), “[t]he Minister’s decision that
an adequate consultation and accommodation process occurred is entitled
to deference”.65 Elaborating, McLachlin C.J.C. and Rowe J. held, “[t]he
chambers judge was required to determine whether the Minister
reasonably concluded that the Crown’s obligation to consult and
accommodate had been met. A reviewing judge does not decide the
constitutional issues raised in isolation on a standard of correctness, but
asks rather whether the decision of the Minister, on the whole, was
reasonable.”66
Despite the suggestion to the contrary in Ktunaxa, the issue of
standard of review on matters of adequacy of consultation is not settled.
Before Dunsmuir, the Court speculated in Haida Nation that questions of
adequacy of consultation would be reviewed on a standard of
62
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reasonableness.67 More recently, and post-Dunsmuir, the Court has
reasoned that correctness is the more appropriate standard for questions
of adequacy of consultation given their constitutional character. The
Court in Little Salmon/Carmacks held that the adequacy of consultation
would be reviewed on a standard of correctness:
In exercising his discretion under the Yukon Lands Act and the
Territorial Lands (Yukon) Act, the Director was required to respect
legal and constitutional limits. In establishing those limits no deference
is owed to the Director. The standard of review in that respect,
including the adequacy of the consultation, is correctness. A decision
maker who proceeds on the basis of inadequate consultation errs in law.
Within the limits established by the law and the Constitution, however,
the Director’s decision should be reviewed on a standard of
reasonableness: Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1
S.C.R. 190, and Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009
SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339. In other words, if there was adequate
consultation, did the Director’s decision to approve the Paulsen grant,
having regard to all the relevant considerations, fall within the range of
reasonable outcomes?68

On the Little Salmon/Carmacks approach, only an administrative
decision-maker’s final decision whether to approve a project, a matter
distinct from adequacy of consultation, is to be reviewed on a standard of
reasonableness. The adequacy of the consultation must be correctly
decided.
In light of Little Salmon/Carmacks, the decisiveness of the choice of
standard of review in Ktunaxa becomes surprising, although the reliance
on categories of question is not. This reliance is consistent with the
prevailing standard of review analysis set out in Dunsmuir. On the
Dunsmuir model, the standard of review will most often be decided
according to the category in which the impugned question falls, rather
than in light of the administrative and statutory context in which the
question arises and is to be decided. For example, questions of fact and
of mixed fact and law call for deference (that is, a reasonableness
standard), while questions of jurisdiction, of the boundaries between
administrative decision-makers and of procedure are to be reviewed
more strictly (that is, on a correctness standard).69 Further, administrative
67
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decisions on some constitutional questions, like matters of the division of
powers or the principles of fundamental justice,70 will not be shown
deference, while decisions on other constitutional matters, like a
decision’s compliance with Charter values,71 will be reviewed on a
standard of reasonableness. On the Dunsmuir model, assigning an
impugned question to a category serves as a proxy for assessing the
constellation of contextual factors that might inform and shape the proper
standard of review.
The category-based analysis established in Dunsmuir was intended to
avoid the analytical uncertainties and debates that flowed from the
contextual “pragmatic and functional” approach72 that preceded it.
However, the post-Dunsmuir case law shows that the uncertainties and
debates have not disappeared; they have simply been repackaged into
uncertainties and debates about which category best describes an
impugned question.73 What is missing in Dunsmuir and in subsequent
cases, including in Ktunaxa, is a principled account of how to choose
when an issue can be comfortably described in terms of several different
categories. The need for such an account arises in Ktunaxa, Clyde River
and Chippewas of the Thames. The question of adequacy of consultation
is simultaneously a procedural question, a constitutional question, and a
question of fact and law. And yet, the Court in Ktunaxa concluded,
without explanation, that the issue’s character as a question of fact and
law was determinative. Why might this be the case? Ktunaxa does not
offer an answer and indeed, ignores the question. And so, we are left
wondering why an executive decision-maker is owed more deference in
the context of procedural obligations arising under section 35(1) than
under the Charter or at common law. Is this grant of deference designed
to reflect the claim that the core relationship to be preserved and to bear
[hereinafter “Baker”]; Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] S.C.J.
No. 11, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 (S.C.C.); Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
[2002] S.C.J. No. 3, 2002 SCC 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Suresh”]; Evan Fox-Decent & Alexander
Pless, “The Charter and Administrative Law Part I: Procedural Fairness” in Flood & Sossin, supra,
note 12, 237, at 241. But see the cases and commentary in Paul Daly, “Canada’s Bipolar
Administrative Law: Time for Fusion” (2014) 40:1 Queen’s L.J. 213.
70
Dunsmuir, id.; Suresh, id.
71
See, e.g., Doré, supra, note 24; Loyola High School, supra, note 28; T.W.U. (B.C.),
supra, note 28; T.W.U. (L.S.U.C.), supra, note 28. See also Lorne Sossin & Mark Friedman,
“Charter Values and Administrative Justice” (2014) 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 391; Matthew Lewans,
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accountability is the one of Indigenous Peoples with the Crown or with
administrative agencies, rather than with the courts? Perhaps. But even if
so, this seems to be a result of a consideration other than that the
category “question of fact and law”, or the notion of “reasonableness”, is
a satisfying or coherent proxy for choice of standard of review in the
circumstances.
Reflecting on the task at hand when articulating the standard of
review in cases like Clyde River, Chippewas of the Thames and Ktunaxa
helps to sharpen the stakes of the debate between categorical and
contextual approaches to standard of review. This is because the cases
require one to assess the measure of deference to be shown to the
decisions of specialized regulatory agencies in a way that does justice to
the very specific institutional relationships involved: the relationships
between institutions and Indigenous Peoples, whose constitutional rights
are at issue when the adequacy of consultation is assessed. The cases
show that what is at stake when choosing the applicable standard of
review is not simply whether the question is one of fact or law, but rather
which institutional relationships are to be preserved, promoted, and
protected, and how to do so. And thus, at a moment when the Court has
expressed its intention to reconsider the standard of review analysis in
place since Dunsmuir,74 the duty to consult context serves not to suggest
what a revised approach might be, but rather raises queries and
considerations that warrant reflection in the revision process: queries about
the roles and relationships of the institutions and actors involved; about the
character of the rights affected and the qualitative measure of the effects;
about what is lost and what is gained with a reliance on proxies; and about
the relationship between confidence, deference, and reasons.

V. CONCLUSION: WHAT CONFIDENCE DEMANDS
In The Constitution of Canada: A Contextual Analysis, Jeremy
Webber reminds us that “[i]n its day-to-day operation, the rule of law
depends, above all, on mechanisms built into the very structure of state
institutions, the watchfulness of the public and the cultivation of an ethic
of legality”.75 In this sense, “the protection of constitutional values
74
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, [2017] S.C.C.A. No. 352 (S.C.C.);
National Football League v. Canada (Attorney General), [2018] S.C.C.A. No. 28 (S.C.C.); Bell
Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), [2018] S.C.C.A. No. 9 (S.C.C.).
75
Jeremy Webber, The Constitution of Canada: A Contextual Analysis (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2015), at 108.
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depends more upon systemic controls, embodied in the detailed practices
and institutions of government — and upon the vigilance of citizens —
than it does on adjudication alone”.76 To preserve and nourish the rule of
law, the institutions that carry out the operations of government —
administrative actors and regulatory agencies among them — need not
only the authority to act in the service of their delegated mandates, but
also conditions in which that authority is cultivated and protected. These
conditions are in part internal, reflected in the institutional morality of
individual organizations, but also external, expressed through legislative,
judicial, and popular conceptions of, and interactions with, government
actors. The narrative of confidence is, as is described in Part II, an
expression of the law’s contribution to those conditions. When the courts
show confidence in administrative agencies as valuable participants in
the common rule of law project, the courts contribute to a culture that
cultivates strong and sound administrative decision-making. The idea is
that administrative agencies will strive to live up to the faith that is
entrusted to them.
As I discussed in Parts II and III, the Supreme Court’s recent
judgments in Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames reflect and
advance the confidence that has been percolating in administrative law
cases outside the duty to consult context. Further, as discussed in Part IV,
these cases also expose some of the concerns with this confidence for
broader issues of public law, like its distraction from the role of other
institutions in reconciliation, statecraft, and institutional design and the
continued reliance on categories of question in the standard of review
analysis. Both of the examples explored in Part IV urge an attentiveness
to the shifts in institutional responsibility and accountability that flow
from judicial confidence in the administrative state. The lesson there is
not that the prevailing confidence should be diminished, but rather to
appreciate its inevitable impact on the architecture of the public order
more broadly and to account for those shifts when necessary. In this
Conclusion, let me point to one final implication of the narrative of
confidence that is revealed by a close reading of Clyde River and
Chippewas of the Thames, an implication that gazes inward at the
internal workings and expectations of administrative decision-making
rather than resting on an examination of the structural whole.
A culture of confidence in the administrative state is one that takes
seriously administrative modes of dispute resolution, one that respects
76
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the impact of administrative decision-making on citizens and the public
interest, and one that still strives to cultivate conditions in which the core
constitutional conversations unfold without resort to the courts. We see
all of these features at work in Clyde River and Chippewas of the
Thames. But, it seems, a culture of confidence would also be one that has
high expectations for the reasons that administrative actors provide for
their decisions and one that would hold decision-makers accountable for
failing to meet these expectations. Such expectations and mechanisms of
accountability would serve as affirmations of the role that reasons play in
sound decision-making and access to procedural and substantive
justice.77 Further, such expectations and mechanisms would help to foster
a culture of administrative decision-making in which affected parties
learn, in forms and ways that are appropriate to the context, why a
decision was reached from the decision-maker herself, rather than from
the courts after judicial review. A culture of decision-making in which
the courts ultimately hold the key to the reasons for administrative
decisions effectively forces affected parties, especially those parties who
are uncertain whether they have been meaningfully heard, properly
understood, or adequately accommodated, to pursue judicial review.
Current trends in administrative law do not always lend themselves to
maintaining meaningful expectations for reason-giving that are
consistent with a narrative of confidence in the administrative state.
Rather, recent case law discloses a willingness by the courts to
supplement, or sometimes provide fully, the reasons that an
administrative decision-maker offered, or could have offered, to explain
and justify her decision.78 Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames also
send mixed signals about what is expected of administrative decisionmakers when it comes to reasons. In Clyde River, adopted in Chippewas
of the Thames, the Court provides, “... [w]hen affected Indigenous groups
have squarely raised concerns about Crown consultation with the NEB,
the NEB must usually address those concerns in reasons, particularly in
respect of project applications requiring deep consultation.”79 Justices
Karakatsanis and Brown go on to explain the value of written reasons.
77
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“Written reasons foster reconciliation”, they write, “by showing affected
Indigenous peoples that their rights were considered and addressed. …
Reasons are ‘a sign of respect [which] displays the requisite comity and
courtesy becoming the Crown as Sovereign toward a prior occupying
nation’”.80 Indeed, they note, “[w]ritten reasons also promote better
decision making”.81 However, the Court then goes on to qualify these
expectations about reason-giving, also drawing on a conception of access
to justice. “This does not mean,” the Court holds,
that the NEB is always required to review the adequacy of Crown
consultation by applying a formulaic “Haida analysis”, as the
appellants suggest. Nor will explicit reasons be required in every case.
The degree of consideration that is appropriate will depend on the
circumstances of each case.82

With these lowered expectations for reason-giving, Clyde River and
Chippewas of the Thames provide one final diagnostic of the current
state of administrative law, one that gives rise to one last worry. A
confidence in the administrative state, one that is worthy of a
constitutional configuration that is, in essence, a regulatory state, must be
not only aspirational and affirming, but also demanding. Confidence is
justified only when accompanied by measures and standards — of fair
procedure, transparent accountability, and justification, for example —
that command integrity in our processes and structures of public
decision-making. When a culture of confidence is stripped of these
features — that is, when confidence is not tempered by a healthy
vigilance and skepticism — we risk substituting confidence with
idealism in our conception of regulatory actors and their contribution to
governance. In their participation in and contestation of the narrative of
confidence, Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames, help us to see —
and can hopefully help us avoid — moving into such a romantic age of
administrative law.
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